Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
7-1991

The Archipelagic States Concept and Regional Stability in
Southeast Asia
Charlotte Ku
Texas A&M University School of Law, cku@law.tamu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Charlotte Ku, The Archipelagic States Concept and Regional Stability in Southeast Asia, 23 Case W. Res.
J. Int'l L. 463 (1991).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/537

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

The Archipelagic States Concept and Regional Stability in
Southeast Asia
CharlotteKu*
I. THE PROBLEM OF ARCHIPELAGIC STATES

For the Philippines and Indonesia, adoption by the Third Law of the
Sea Conference in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (1982 LOS
Convention) of Articles 46-54 on "Archipelagic States," marked the capstone of the two countries' efforts to win international recognition for the
archipelagic principle.' For both, acceptance by the international community of this principle was an important step in their political development from a colony to a sovereign state. Their success symbolized
independence from colonial status and their role in the shaping of the
international community in which they live.
It was made possible by their efforts, in the years before 1982, to
negotiate a regional consensus on the need for the archipelagic principle,
a consensus that eventually united the states of Southeast Asia at the
Third Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III). The concept was a
critical one, because as Indonesian diplomat Noegroho Wisnomoerti
wrote:
The nationhood of Indonesia is built on the concept of unity between
the Indonesian islands and the inter-connecting waters. Those seas are
regarded as a unifying, not a separating element.. .It was the first
political manifestation of the concept of national unity which had inspired the nationalist movement, started in 1908, to lead the national
struggle for independence. 2
Similarly, the Constitution of the Philippines links the archipelagic
principle to the national unity of the country:
The national territory consists of the Philippine Archipelago which is
the ancestral home of the Filipino people, and which is composed of all
Administrative and Programs Director, the American Society of International Law (Washington, D.C.).
1 See UNrTED NATIONS, THE LAW OF THE SEA: UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA WITH INDEx AND FINAL ACT OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, 15-18 (1983) [hereinafter 1982 LOS CONVENTION].
2 Wisnomoerti, Indonesia and the Law of the Sea in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROBLEMS FROM
THE EAST AsIAN PERSPErCvE 392 (C. Park & J. Park eds. 1987). See also Hamzah, Indonesia's
Archipelagic Regime, 8 MARINE POL'Y 32 (1984).
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the islands and waters embraced therein... [t]he waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago irrespective of
part of the internal waters of the
their breadth
3 and dimensions, form
Philippines.

The critical passage in the 1982 LOS Convention's provisions on
archipelagic states comes in Article 46(b) "'[A]rchipelago'

means a

group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and
other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands,
waters, and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, eco-

nomic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as
such."4
The land portions of an archipelago pose few jurisdictional ques-

tions. However, the different attitudes which the European states
adopted in the seventeenth century towards land and towards sea have
made the legal status of the "interconnecting waters" included in archipelagos by Article 46 problematical. In the case of land, exclusivity has
been the rule; while the sea has been viewed as a commonage since the
end of the debate between Hugo Grotius and John Selden over open and
the norm and was enforced by
closed seas.' Freedom of the seas became
6

the navies of the imperial powers.

Despite a steady erosion of this principle in state practice since
3 As quoted inWirajuda, Politico-Legal Implications of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention to
the ASEAN States 75 (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, University of Virginia 1988).
4 1982 Los CONVENTION, supra note 1, at 15. While the archipelagic principle has become
most closely identified with the Philippines and Indonesia, they are not the only states which can lay
claim to archipelagic status. See D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 247 (1.
Shearer ed. 1982). Churchill and Lowe, for example, count between twenty-five and thirty-five states
which would fit the Article 46 definition cited above. See R. CHURCHILL and A. LOwE, THE LAW
OF THE SEA 92-93 (1985). Additional states which fit the definition, but do not consider themselves
archipelagic states include the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand and Japan. Conditions imposed by Article 47 of the 1982 LOS Convention further reduce the number of states claiming
archipelagic status.
5 See T. FULTON, SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 1-22 (1911); Ku, The Concept ofRes Communis
in InternationalLaw, 12 J. HIsT. EUR. IDEAS 459-77 (1990).
6 Freedom of the seas was already the practice in the Indian Ocean where Alexandrowicz hypothesized that "Mhe advocacy of the freedom of the sea by Grotius might have been to a great
extent the outcome of his inquiry into maritime practice in the Indian Ocean in which a regime of
mare liberum prevailed." Alexandrowicz, The Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations, 123
HAGUE RECUEIL DES COURS 162 (1968).
State practice since World War II, however, including that of such former imperial powers as
the United States, has steadily extended a state's jurisdiction into the commonage for purposes of
military security, environmental protection, customs control and exploitation of resources. See, eg.,
Proclamation 2668, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945).
Further erosion to the principle of freedom of the seas came as a result of the 1951 AngloNorwegian Fisheries Case which allowed for special considerations in the delimiting of a state's
territorial sea. See Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.C.J. 116.

THE ARCHIPELAGIC STATES CONCEPT

World War II and, since the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,7 an
increased acceptance of special circumstances in the delimiting of a
state's jurisdiction over adjacent waters, Indonesia and the Philippines
devoted decades to winning acceptance of the archipelagic principle. The
magnitude of the problem for the two archipelagic states was well
demonstrated in the conclusions of the 1957 report prepared by Jens
Evensen of Norway for the First United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS I).' Neither treaties nor state practice confirmed the
special political, economic and security concerns of archipelagic states by
recognizing a special legal status for their land and water.

II. THE SEARCH FOR AN INTERNATiONAL FRAMEWORK
The 1957 report began by trying to identify an archipelago as "a
formation of two or more islands (islets or rocks) which geographically
may be considered as a whole,"9 but hastened to add that "[o]ne glance
at the map is sufficient to show that the geographical characteristics of
archipelagos vary widely."' 10 A distinction was then drawn between
coastal and mid-ocean archipelagos. The problem of delimiting territorial seas for states with ragged coastlines made up of coastal archipelagos
had been addressed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case." While directly applicable only
to the two parties of the case, the ICJ's decision had far-reaching effect in
lending weight to the use of straight baselines to delimit the territorial sea
for states with unusual coastlines.
The problem of delimiting the territorial sea in the case of archipelagos "situated out in the ocean at such a distance from the coasts of firm
land as to be considered as an independent whole rather than forming
part of or outer coastline of the mainland,"' 2 was another matter. The
Evensen report noted that:
In addition to the difficulties arising out of the wide variety of the geographical characteristics and the specific economic, historical and
political factors involved in each case, the legal approach to the questions involved is further complicated by the fact that such a host of
be involved for
different legal principles-sometimes conflicting-may
13
the concrete delimitation of territorial waters.
7 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.CJ. 116.
8 Certain Legal Aspects Concerning the Delimitation of the Territorial Waters of the Archipelagos, Report by Jens Evenson, 1 U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea (Preparatory Document No. 15)
at 289 U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/18 (1958) [hereinafter Archipelagos].
9 Id at 290.
10 Id at 289-90.
11 Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 I.CJ. 116.
12 Archipelagos, supra note 8,at 290.
13 Idj
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To illustrate these difficulties, the report included a survey of earlier
studies addressing maritime issues beginning with the late 1880s. 14 The
first formal proposal acknowledging the special character and needs of
archipelagos came in 1930 at the Hague Codification Conference.15 A
draft convention, commissioned by the League of Nations, included the
provision that "[iln the case of archipelagos, the constituent islands are
considered as forming a whole and the width of the territorial sea shall be
measured from the islands most distant from the center of the archipelago." 16 Reactions to this draft in 1930 were predictably varied with
some governments rejecting the idea that "archipelagos should be considered as a single unit."17 In this view, each island would have its own
band of territorial waters. Other governments maintained that a "single
belt of territorial waters could be drawn around archipelagos provided
that the islands and islets of the archipelago were not further apart than a
certain maximum."1 " But there was no agreement on a maximum distance. A third position was that "archipelagos -must be regarded as a
whole where the geographical peculiarities warranted such treatment." 19
With these views in mind, the Hague Conference proceeded by trying to
set a maximum distance between islands, beyond which they could not be
considered as a unit for purposes of delimiting their territorial sea. The
waters contained in the unit would not be considered as internal waters,
but as "marginal seas."' 20 Conference participants, however, were unable
to reach agreement on a maximum distance and nothing was included in
the final convention on archipelagos.
In the years between the Hague Conference and the completion of
the International Law Commission's (ILC) 1956 draft articles on the
high seas and the territorial sea, there was little progress. No archipe14 See ia at 290-91. See also O'CONNELL, which notes that:
The question of assimilating clusters of coastal reefs and cays for the purpose of determiniag sovereignty thereover (sic) arose on several occasions during the nineteenth century,
notably in the eays of Florida and Cuba, and the reefs and banks of the Bahamas and
Bermuda. However, these were not, strictly speaking, instances of the coherence of islands
and, even as late as 1920, diplomatic practice utilized the archipelago concept only as a
criterion for the political assimilation of islands, and not for territorial sea purposes.
O'CoNNELL, supra note 4, at 237-38 (emphasis added).
15 League of Nations, Acts of the Conference for the Codification of International Law, held at
the Hague from March 13th to April 12th, 1930, Doc. C. 351.M. 145. 1930. v (as cited in Charney,
Technology and International Negotiations, 76-78, 82 (1982)) [hereinafter Hague Codification
Conference].
16 Amended Draft Convention prepared by Schiicking for the Committee of Experts of the
Hague Codification Conf. of 1930, League of Nations Doc. C-196 M-70 1927 at 72 (1927) (quotedin
Archipelagos, supra note 8, at 292).
17 Archipelagos, supra note 8,at 292.
18 Id

19 Id
20 Id
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lagic principle was included in the draft the ILC presented to UNCLOS
I. The commentary accompanying the draft, however, noted that the
commission had intended to supplement its general treatment of islands
in Article 10 "with a provision concerning groups of islands," but that
like the 1930 Hague Conference, "the Commission was unable to overcome the difficulties involved."'" "The problem is similarly complicated
by the different forms it takes in different archipelagos. The Commission
was also prevented from stating an opinion, not only by disagreement on
the breadth of the territorial sea, but also by lack of technical information on the subject.... ."I'
Unable to discern any pattern based on a survey of available scholarship and state practice, Evensen concluded in his report that "every
case must be treated on its individual merits.. .The geographical configuration of the archipelago concerned will be of primary importance for
such determination, though other factors-such as historical and economical factors-may play a role."12 3 It was thus left up to the states to
decide what, if anything, should be done with the claims of mid-ocean
archipelago states. At the heart of the international community's difficulty in designing generally applicable standards for a variety of island
groupings was concern over the implications for international shipping of
recognizing territorial jurisdiction over large portions of the earth's waters. Moreover, this dispute between the political/security interests of
the archipelagic states and the passage interests of the maritime states
had a third dimension: it pitted newly independent states against more
established ones, many of whom had been colonial powers. Alluding to
this division of interests, the Indonesian delegate to the 1958 Geneva
conference remarked in exasperation that: "The fact that the nations
most directly interested in the question were few and comparatively weak
was no reason for leaving the problem unsolved."'24
III.

COLONIAL ORIGINS OF THE PHILIPPINE AND INDONESIAN
CLAIMS TO ARCHIPELAGIC STATUS

Philippine claims to archipelagic status stem from two treaties concluded between Spain and the United States in 1898 and 1900. Article
III of the 1898 Treaty of Paris states that "Spain cedes to the United
States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within" a specified line." This was suppleId at 293.
IdL at 293-94.
23 Id at 302.
24 1958 U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary Records 44, Doe. A/Conf. 13/42
[hereinafter U.N.C.L.O.S.].
25 Treaty of Peace, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, art. II, para. 1, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No.
343.
21

22
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mented by the 1900 agreement, in which Spain also ceded to the United
States islands claimed by Spain on behalf of the Philippines lying outside
of the lines used to define the Philippine archipelago in the 1898 treaty. 6
The practice of using the archipelagic principle to define the territory of the Philippines was continued by the United States in the years of
U.S. control of that territory.2 7 The Philippines' neighbors, however,
were reluctant to recognize the Philippine archipelago based on historic
title because of claims to disputed territory. These included disputes
with Indonesia over the Island of Palmas and with Malaysia over Sabah.
Furthermore, Philippine claims of historic archipelagic status could only
date from 1898, since the earlier Spanish Law of Waters of 186621 provided for territorial seas to the width recognized by international law
rather than an all-inclusive archipelagic boundary. 9
The Philippines, however, in the 1950s, continued its campaign for
international recognition of its special geographical circumstances. The
Philippines clearly stated its position in a note of December 12, 1955 to
the Secretariat of the United Nations. Responding to the International
Law Commission's draft articles on the high seas and territorial sea:
The position of the Philippine Government in the matter is that
all waters around, between and connecting the different islands belonging to the Philippine Archipelago irrespective of their widths or dimensions, are necessary appurtenances of its land territory, forming an
integral part of the national or inland waters; subject to the exclusive
sovereignty of the Philippines.30
The Philippine claim was not accepted by the international community. The reaction of the United States:
[W]ith reference to the position of the Philippine Government
quoted supra was that the lines referred to in bilateral treaties between
the United States and the United Kingdom and Spain merely delimited
the area within which land areas belong to the Philippines and that
they were not intended as boundary lines. The United States, in 1958,
stated that it recognized only a 3-mile territorial sea for each island.3 1
Consequently, the Philippines tried in the 1960s and 1970s to establish
further legal bases for its archipelagic claims by defining its territory as
26 Nov. 7, 1900, United States-Spain, 31 Stat. 1942, T.S. No. 345.
27 See, eg., Convention Delimiting the Boundary between the Phillippine Archipelago and the
State of North Borneo, Jan. 2, 1930, United States-United Kingdom, 47 Stat. 2198, T.S. No. 856.
"This treaty defined the Philippine Archipelago as: the territory acquired by the United States of
America by virtue of the Treaties of December 10, 1898, and November 7, 1900, with Her Majesty
the Queen Regent of Spain .. ." Id.
28 O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 247.
29 Id.
30 As quoted in 4 WHrrIEMAN D.G. INT'L L. 282-83 (1965).
31 Id (emphasis added).

THE ARCHIPEL4GIC STATES CONCEPT

an archipelago in its domestic legislation and constitutions.32
For Indonesia, the archipelagic issue emerged at the time of independence in 1949, as the new state tried to define its national territory.
The new government had decided that Indonesia would keep in force
previously existing laws and regulations until new ones could be enacted.
This included the 1939 Netherlands' Territorial Sea and Maritime Districts Ordinance (Territoriale Zee een Maritieme Kringen Ordonnantie)3 3 which provided for a three mile territorial sea around each island of
the Dutch East Indies-five large ones and several thousand smaller
ones, of which four thousand are inhabited. This approach effectively
chopped Indonesia into pieces, as the high seas between the islands were
not subject to Indonesian jurisdiction. This maritime regime aggravated
the difficulties Indonesia found in uniting an ethnically diverse country
immediately following independence.3 4
Having won its independence from the Dutch, Indonesia was well
aware of the importance of defining its territory in order to support political unification, and moved quickly to do so. As Wisnomoerti explained:
"Such a foundation for our nationhood is indeed imperative for the survival of our nation, which consists of hundreds of ethnic origins with
different cultural and social backgrounds as well as regional languages." 35 As Wisnomoerti further noted, Indonesia defines its national
territory as "an inseparable land and water area [tanah air], of which
ocean water is viewed as a unifying factor in an 'island studded sea space'
of this vast archipelago. ' ' 36 There was practical necessity for this approach, as explained by the Indonesian delegate to UNCLOS I:
The traditional method of measuring the territorial sea from the lowwater mark was based on the assumption that the coastal State possessed a land territory forming part of a continent. In the case of archipelagos, such a system could not be applied without harmful effects.
An archipelago being essentially a body of water studded with islands
rather than islands with water around them, the delimitation of its territorial sea had to be approached from a quite different angle. In the
opinion of the Indonesian Government, an archipelago should be regarded as a single unit, the water between and 3around
the islands
7
forming an integral whole with the land territory.
32 Wirajuda, supra note 3, at 74-82.
33 As cited in O'CONNELL, supra note 4, at 249.
34 See, eg., Leifer and Nelson who write: "Governments in Indonesia have long exhibited an
acute concern about the political integrity of an ethnically diverse archipelago which had no historical existence as a political entity before the administrative consolidation of the Netherlands East
Indies." Leifer & Nelson, Conflict of Interest in the Straits of Malacca, 49 INT'L Arr. 190, 191
(1973).
35 Wisnomoerti, supra note 2, at 392.
36 .d
37 U.N.C.L.O.S, supra note 24, at 44.
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Thus, in December 1957, the Indonesian Government issued the
Djuanda Declaration, which called for the use of straight baselines joining together the outermost seaward points of the islands in the archipelago to outline the territorial limits of Indonesia including both islands
and water. The declaration (Announcement on the Territorial Waters of
the Republic of Indonesia) stated that:
[H]istorically, the Indonesian archipelago has been an entity since
time immemorial. In view of territorial entirety and of preserving the
wealth of the Indonesian state, it is deemed necessary to consider all
waters between the islands an entire entity.
...On the ground of the above considerations, the Government
states that all waters around, between and connecting, the islands or
parts of islands belonging to the Indonesian archipelago irrespective of
their width or dimension are natural appurtenances of its land territory
and therefore an integral part of the inland
38 or national waters subject
to the absolute sovereignty of Indonesia.
While the declaration had no legal effect, even for Indonesia domestically, it generated protests from France, the United States, the United
Kingdom, Australia, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Japan. The Soviet Union and China, on the other hand, supported the claim as a gesture of friendship towards Indonesia, and because of their limited
maritime interests at the time.3 9
In 1960, Indonesia acted to give substance to the Djuanda Declaration when it adopted Government Regulation No. 4 on Indonesian Waters, which called for "straight lines connecting the outermost points on
the low water mark of the outermost islands" to delimit its territory. 4
The Philippines adopted similar internal legislation in 1961, calling for
the use of straight baselines drawn by joining the outermost points of the
outermost islands to establish the country's national territory.4" The
Philippines also removed references to historic title as the basis for its
archipelagic claims.4 2
With this inconclusive background dating from their colonial past,
the Philippines and Indonesia moved to gain recognition of the archipelagic approach at UNCLOS I. Their overtures were rebuffed in 1958 due
to the Conference's inability to define an archipelago and to find a proper
place within the existing framework of high seas and territorial sea for
the waters included in an archipelago. Balancing the archipelagic states'
political, security and economic needs that required exclusive jurisdic38 Whiteman, supra note 30, at 284.
39 Id. at 284-85. See also Wirajuda, supra note 3, at 249.
40 As quoted in Wirajuda, supra note 3, at 38. See also Hamzah, supra note 2, at 30.
41 Republic Act No. 3046, An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines (cited in Wirajuda, supra note 3, at 56).
42 Wirajuda, supra note 3, at 90-91.
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tion, with the need to keep well-travelled sea lanes open and available to
the world's shipping states proved impossible. The problem remained
unresolved through UNCLOS II in 1960 which was unable to establish
an acceptable width of the territorial sea. The archipelagic issue, which
had been linked to the territorial sea issue since the 1930 Hague Codification Conference,4 3 was once again put aside. After 1960, dissatisfied with
the results of these two multilateral negotiations, the Philippines and Indonesia turned to bilateral negotiations within Southeast Asia to provoke
movement on the international community's recognition of archipelagic
states.
IV.

THE ARCHIPELAGO PACKAGE

This reciprocal demand for recognition of sovereignty and- safeguarding of user rights constituted the basis of the compromise finally
struck on the archipelago issue at UNCLOS III and spelled out in Part
IV of the 1982 LOS Convention.' The conference outcome reflected the
separate arrangements made by the archipelagic states to win support for
the archipelagic concept in the years leading up to UNCLOS III." The
1982 LOS Convention's provisions on archipelagos contained three levels
of assurance, the first and most specific of which was given to Malaysia in
Article 47:
If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State lies
between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State, existing rights and all other legitimate interests which the latter State has
traditionally exercised in such waters and all rights stipulated46by agreement between those States shall continue and be respected.
Secondly, a more general assurance was given to states in the region
of the two archipelagic states-specifically, Singapore, Thailand and Japan-in Article 51, paragraph 1. The wording of this provision illustrated the nature of the linkage made:
Archipelagic States shall respect existing agreements with other
43 League of Nations, supra note 15.
44 United Nations, supra note 1.
45 Indonesia, for example, concluded fifteen maritime boundary treaties with its neighbors
prior to UNCLOS III. Less activity was required of the Philippines, whose archipelagic claim did
not affect as wide a range of interests as did that of Indonesia. The 1947 Bases Agreement and the
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the United States took care of the major
shipping and access to waterway concerns of the United States For texts, see Philippines Mutual
Security, Jan. 4, 7, 1952, 3 U.S.T. 4644, T.I.A.S. No. 2617; Philippines Mutual Defense, Aug. 30,
1951, 3 U.S.T. 3947, T.I.A.S. No. 2529; Military Bases, Mar. 14, 1947, 61 Stat. 4019, T.I.A.S. No.
1775. [hereinafter 1947 Military Bases Agreement]. See also McDorman, Implementation of the
LOS Convention: Options, Impediments and the ASEANStates, 18 OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 279-303

(1987).
46 1982 LOS CONVENTION supra note 1, at 15.
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States and shall recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring States in certain areas falling within archipelagic waters. The terms and conditions
of the exercise of such rights and activities, including the nature, the
extent and the areas to which they apply, shall, at the request of any of
the States concerned, be regulated by bilateral agreements between
them. Such rights shall not be transferred to or shared with third
States or their nationals.4 7
And finally, assurance was given to all parties in Article 52, in providing that "ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage
through archipelagic waters... ." Paragraph 2 of Article 52 addressed
the chief concern expressed by the archipelagic states-that of security:
The archipelagicState may, without discrimination in form or in
fact amongst foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its
archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essentialfor the protection of its security. Such suspension
48
shall take effect only after having been duly published.
To safeguard, in explicit terms, the general balance struck by the
above articles between the need for passage through the area (other than
straits used for international navigation) and the archipelagic state's need
for security, Article 53 gave the archipelagic state the right to regulate
where and how ships and aircraft pass through its territory by designating specific sea lanes. Rights of passage through these archipelagic sea
lanes are regarded as those of transit passage:
(1) An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes
thereabove, suitable for the safe, continuous and expeditious passage of
foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and
the adjacent territorial sea.
(2) All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes
passage in such sea lanes and air routes.
(3) Archipelagic sea lanes passage is the exercise in accordance
with the present Convention of the rights of navigation and overflight
in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious
and unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
and another part of the high seas or an exclusive
49
economic zone.
Unlike bilateral agreements which specify and confirm the rights
and duties of the archipelagic states vis-i-vis their "immediately adjacent" neighbors, the formula outlining the rights of passage for the wider
international community, contained in Articles 52 and 53, remains
47 Id. at 16.
48 Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 17.
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largely unspecified and untested beyond the convention itself. Indonesia's temporary closing of the Sunda and Lombok Straits for military
exercises in September 1988 began what will likely be a long process of
testing and challenge to give both form and substance to the 1982 LOS
Convention's mutually dependent concepts of archipelagic waters and
archipelagic sea lanes passage.
Confusion stems, in part, from the three separate legal bases for passage through the narrow waters enclosed within the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos. The three are: innocent passage (articles 17-32);5o
transitpassage in straits used for international navigation (articles 3444);51 and archipelagicsea lanes passage through archipelagic waters and
the adjacent territorial sea (articles 53 and 54).52 The 1982 LOS Convention addresses all three legal bases, but does not establish a hierarchy in
case of conflict.
The confusion is greatest in the case of Indonesia, which contains
waters through which the regime of passage is innocent, straits through
which the passage is transit, and archipelagic waters through which passage is archipelagic sea lanes. In all three cases, passage is allowed, but
the right of the coastal state with jurisdiction over the waters in question
to control passage varies depending on the regime. Of the three passage
regimes, the least restrictive for the maritime states is transit passage
through and over a strait used for international navigation because it allows the coastal state the least discretion in controlling passage.5 3
Both innocent passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage allow the
coastal state discretion over how and when passage will take place.14 In
order to limit arbitrary disruptions to either the rights of transit passage
or of archipelagic sea lanes passage, Articles 41 and 53 of the 1982 LOS
Convention require states to work with "the competent international organization"r-the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the case
of shipping and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in
the case of aircraft-prior to putting any restrictive regulations into
effect.
The 1988 Sunda and Lombok straits' closing provided an example
of the issues which will arise from implementation of the 1982 LOS Convention. Indonesia's unilateral action caused particular alarm, not only
because the straits are commonly used shipping lanes, but also because of
their strategic importance. Leifer noted:
50

See 1982 LOS CONvENTON, supra note 1.

51 Id.
52 Id.

53 Ido arts. 37-38, at 12.
54 While passage over archipelagic sea lanes may be transit in character, designation of the sea
lanes is left to the state with jurisdiction over the waters, including the option of not designating any

such lanes at all.
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That of Sunda provides the most direct route between the U.S. naval
base at Subic Bay in the Philippines and its military and communications facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The deep water
Lombok Strait-together with that of Makassar to its north-provides
an alternative route to that of Malacca for deep draught oil tankers en
route from the Gulf to South Korea and Japan.55
Indonesia justified the action based on its "sovereign right to close
the straits"--precisely the kind of unilateral action the 1982 LOS Convention tried to foreclose in Article 53-but tried to have it both ways. 6
On the one hand, it claimed rights over archipelagic waters, a specific
creation of the 1982 LOS Convention. On the other hand, Indonesia
maintained that it need not concern itself with the obligations of the 1982
LOS Convention because it was not yet in force. As Leifer pointed out,
Indonesia "cannot deny the validity of the Law of the Sea Convention
without also jeopardising (sic) its archipelagic status."5 " The inherent
link made in the 1982 LOS Convention allowed for extensions ofjurisdiction by the archipelagic states into areas previously regarded as the high
seas on the necessary condition that rights of transit passage be
maintained.
The question remains whether states which exercise rights of passage through such waters are required by the same inherent link to recognize archipelagic status even though they are not party to the 1982 LOS
Convention. Two such states are the United States and the United Kingdom, which have refused to become parties to the convention, yet insist
on rights of passage. The actions and arrangements of all concerned will
ultimately determine the future integrity of the archipelago package.
V.

REGIONAL INTERESTS

Having ratified the 1982 LOS Convention, the two chief proponents
of the archipelago principle, Indonesia and the Philippines, are now obligated to enact national legislation to delimit their waters, to designate
archipelagic sea lanes, and to ensure passage through these waters.5 "
However, in the designation of archipelagic sea lanes, neither country has
yet moved to inform the IMO of its designation of such sea lanes. They
may be waiting for the entry into force of the 1982 LOS Convention
before acting, but conflicts are brewing in the area, as both states already
claim privileges derived from archipelagic status.5 9
55 Leifer, Indonesia Waives the Rules, 1989 FAR E. ECON. REv. 17 (Jan. 5, 1989).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 The Philippines ratified the 1982 LOS Convention with a declaration on May 8, 1984. Indonesia ratified the convention on Feb. 3, 1986. See 26 I.L.M. 1109-10 (1987).
59 See, eg., the closure of the Lombok and Sunda Straits by Indonesia as discussed supra note
56, at 18-19.
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In the case of the Philippines, fulfilling the terms of Article 53 on
archipelagic sea lanes passage may require changes in the country's con-

stitution, which rejects the concept of passage through its "internal waters."'

Historically, this assertion has generated little objection from the

major maritime powers, the one power with major interests here, the
United States, having assured its navigational rights through bilateral
treaties.6 1 This situation may change, however, given expanded Soviet
naval interests in the region and the current renegotiation of the U.S.

bases agreements, due to expire in 1991. An indicator of changing Soviet
attitudes was the U.S.S.R.'s objection to the Philippine ratification of the
1982 LOS Convention, accompanied by a declaration, permitted by Article 310 of the convention. 6 2 The Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Byelorussia and the Ukraine objected that, in fact, the Philippines
had made a reservation, which was expressly forbidden by Article 309.63
They particularly objected to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Philippine Decla-

ration which stated that:
6. The provisions of the Convention on archipelagic passage through
sea lanes do not nullify or impair the sovereignty of the Philippines as
an archipelagic State over the sea lanes and do not deprive it of authority to enact legislation to protect its sovereignty, independence, and
security;
7. The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of in60 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, art. 1, sec. 1, reprinted in Constitutions of
the Countries of the World (A.P. Blaustein & G.H. Flanz eds. 1991). Article 1, Section 1 of the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions of the Philippines states that: "The waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago [irrespective in 1973 version] [regardless in 1987 version] of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines."
61 See Article IV of the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, supra note 45, which states that:
United States vessels operated by or for the War or Navy Department, the Coast Guard or
the Coast and Geodetic Survey, and the military forces of the United States, military and
naval aircraft and Government owned vehicles, including armor, shall be accorded free
access to and movement between ports and United States bases throughout the Philippines,
including territorial waters, by land, air, and sea....
D.P. O'Connell points out that, despite these assurances, the movement of nuclear powered
ships and use of U.S. bases for military maneuvers may not be covered by the agreements and may
require prior authorization from the Philippine government. See O'Connell, Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in InternationalLaw, 45 Barr. YBK.INT'L L. 32-37, (1971).
62 Article 310 states that:
Article 309 does not preclude a State, when signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, from making declarations or statements, however phrased or named, with a view,
inter alia, to the harmonization of its laws and regulations with the provisions of this Convention, provided that such declarations or statements do not purport to exclude or to
modify the legal effect of the provisions of this Convention in their application to that
State.
1982 LOS CONVENTON, supra note 1,at 106.
63 See 26 I.L.M. 1116-22 (1987); Gamble, The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law ofthe Sea: A
'Midstream" Assessment of the Effectiveness ofArticle 309, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 627 (1987).
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ternal waters under the Constitution of the Philippines, and removes
straits connecting this water with the economic zone or high seas from
the rights of
foreign vessels to transit passage for international
4
navigation.f

In practical terms, the Philippine Declaration does not contravene
the convention, because the waters within the Philippine archipelago
connect neither parts of the high seas nor exclusive economic zones and
thus are not subject to the rights of transit passage as provided for in
Article 53. Unlike Philippine waters, Indonesian archipelagic waters
connect parts of the high seas and exclusive economic zones at several
points: the Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, Ombai and Timor Straits.
Wirajuda pointed out that this geographic reality had already prompted
Indonesia to adopt something like archipelagic sea lanes through domestic legislation in 1962.65 He also speculated on whether Indonesia's unilateral actions in 1988 to close its straits were taken to put the country in
the best bargaining position when it came time formally to designate sea
lanes through the IMO.6 6 Despite the interests of the two countries,
there has been no coordination between the Philippines and Indonesia to
ensure expeditious passage for international shipping in the region.6 7
64 Id. at 1114.
65 Wirajuda observed: "A close examination of the Government Regulation No. 8 of 1962
which governs such passage, reveals that it actually contains more than simply either a right or a
facility of innocent passage. Its sealane [sic] provisions provide a genesis of what is now called the
archipelagic sealanes passage." Wirajuda, supra note 3, at 136.
66 Id.

at 177.

67 Ia Geographic logic, as well as strategic and technological necessity, may ultimately narrow the field of potential sea lanes in the two countries to those identified by Valencia and Marsh:
Major normal routes through Philippine archipelagic waters include:
1. Makassar Strait-Celebes Sea-South of Mindanao;
2. Makassar Strait--Celebes Sea--Sibutu Passage-Sulu Sea;
3. Pacific Ocean-San BernardinoStrait-Verde Island Passage-SouthChina Sea;
4. Pacific Ocean-SurigaoStrait--Sulu Sea-BalabacStrait-South China Sea;
5. Pacific Ocean-Balintang Channel-South China Sea;
6. South China Sea-PalawanPassage-West of Luzon-South China Sea.
Major normal passage routes through Indonesian archipelagic waters include:
1. Malacca-SingaporeStrait-JavaSea;
2. Malacca-SingaporeStrait-NatunaSea;
3. Indian Ocean-Sunda Sea-GasparStrait;
4. Indian Ocean-Lombok Strait-MakassarStrait; 5. Timor Sea-Ombai-Wetar
Straits-Banda Sea;
6. Torres Sea-ArafuraSea-Ceram Sea-HalmaheraSea.
Relative costs associated with the use of certain routes add an economic dimension to the importance of these waterways. Valencia and Marsh, for example, estimate that it would cost over U.S.
$100 million a year to reroute Japan-bound oil tankers to the Lombok-Makassar Straits from the
Malacca Strait. Valencia & Marsh, Access to Straits and Sealanes in Southeast Asian Seas Legal
Economic, and Strategic Considerations, 16 J. MAR. L. & COM. 514-7 (1985).
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Acceptance of the archipelagic principle by the international community through the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was not only the
product of hard and persistent bargaining by the Philippines and Indonesia. It was also an expression of the international community's awareness of the two states' need to find appropriate means of defining their
national territory and exercising jurisdiction over that territory. Like all
states which achieved independence in the rush to decolonization after
World War II, both value highly the ability to chart their national
courses without outside interference. Their concern for freedom of action is characteristic of the nations of the entire Southeast Asian region,
where states, with the single exception of Thailand, were at one time,
subjects of European colonial rule.
The same desire to achieve freedom from outside interference found
expression in the 1976 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
declaration of the region as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN). A Malaysian initiative, the declaration was based on a belief that "regional peace and stability can only be achieved if the region is
free from outside interference and big power rivalries." 6 The lengths to
which ASEAN members (currently Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) go to avoid conflict within the region is indicative of their recognition that regional conflicts which are not
solved by powers within the region will be solved by powers from outside
the region. The Philippines and Indonesia clearly recognized, in the
evolution of the concept of archipelagic states within the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention framework, that an effective balancing of regional interests and a regional consensus on the rights of archipelagic states were
necessary preconditions to success on the international front. 69 Their efforts, through bilateral treaty frameworks, to arrive at a modus vivendi
with their neighbors and principal partners, paid off in the Southeast
Asian consensus at UNCLOS III. Recognition by the international community of the Philippine and Indonesian archipelagos fulfilled the two
states' desire for international acceptance of an exception to the norm in
defining their territory.
As a result, the development of the concept of archipelagic states
was not only a benchmark in the codification of international law, but
also a further step towards the integration of new states into the Westphalian system. The concept acknowledged the special needs of some
states with regard to their territorial integrity and political stability.
However, opportunities for both conflict and cooperation continue to exist as a result of the acceptance of the archipelagic principle. The ability
68 Id. at 549.

69 See Wirajuda, supra note 3.
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of the Philippines and of Indonesia now to maintain that political stability and to advance their interests while maintaining regional harmony
will be the test of their strength and vitality as independent states.

